






Man and the Origin of Thinking
Abstract
This paper explores key aspects of Mullā Ṣadrā’s understanding of man’s being in the world, 
where the embryo of perception and thinking is said to emerge under the unique conditions 
of man as the articulate social being. The same being who can speak also speaks to himself 
and about himself. But since man’s “true reality” finds its root in the divine knowing and 
being in a twofold existentiation, at the heart of his being in the world lies intellect by which 
he “returns” from materiality to his origin in the divine, where all knowing and being begin 
and end. The problem of knowing and being – also expressible in terms of the one and the 
many – dates back to the Presocratics. To situate Ṣadrā’s understanding of it, other philoso-
phers are discussed, including Kant, the rationale of whose arguments surrounding the “I” 
were noted in Heidegger’s critique. This is not primarily an epistemological problem for 
Islamicate philosophy or bereft of wider interest in the social animal called “man” (insān).
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Introduction
Man	is	central	to	the	philosophy	of	being,	which	Ṣadrā1 expounded with great 












Le livre des pénétrations métaphysiques,	Ver-
dier,	Paris	1988,	which	contains	valuable	lexi-
cal	insights	into	the	unfolding	of	knowing	and	
being;	 Fazlur	 Rahman’s	 now	 classical	work,	
The Philosophy of Mulla Sadra,	SUNY	Press,	
Albany	 1975;	 Seyyed	 Hossein	 Nasr,	 “Mulla	
Sadra	and	the	Doctrine	of	the	Unity	of	Being”,	
Philosophical  Forum	4	 (1972),	pp.	153–161;	
Henry	 Corbin,	 En  Islam  Iranian,	 four	 vol-
umes,	Gallimard,	Paris	1972,	a	general	work;	 
 
and	more	 recently,	 but	 rather	 incompetently,	
Ibrahim	 Kalin,	 Knowledge  in  Later  Islamic  
Philosophy: Mulla Sadra on Existence, Intel-
lect, and Intuition,	 Oxford	 University	 Press,	
New	York	 2010,	which	 anyway	 is	much	 too	
interpretative.	A	relatively	more	focused	anal-
ysis	 is	 presented	 by	 Maria	 Massi	 Dakake,	
“Hierarchies	 of	 Knowing	 in	 Mullā	 Ṣadrā’s	
Commentary on the Uṣūl al-kāfī”,	Journal of 




Hashemi,	 “Knowledge	 as	 a	Mode	 of	 Being:	
Mulla	 Sadra’s	 Theory	 of	 Knowledge”,	 So-












(the reality of man)	–	like	all	other	realities	–	finds	 its	root	interiorly	in	the	
knowledge	of	God,	not	in	the	“world	of	the	flesh”.	Ṣadrā	describes	God,	who	
alone	articulates	knowing	and	being	in	a	single	existentiation,	as	al-Fāʿil al-
ḥaqīqī  (real  cause)	of	 the	emergence	of	all	created	beings,	first	 originating	
their	“beginnings”	and	then	making	their	goal	the	return	to	Him	by	way	of	
intellect,	soul,	nature	and	matter.4
He means this return in the philosophic sense that existence begins and ends 




The preoccupation with knowing and being traces back to at least the Preso-
cratics,	but	the	debate	about	how	the	human	knower	fares	in	their	unfolding	
came	to	a	head	in	the	Ḥikma6	tradition,	beginning	in	earnest	in	the	ninth	cen-
tury.	 Since	 antiquity,	 the	 problem	has	 been	 considered	 amenable	 to	 analy-
sis	into	oneness	and	manifoldness,	a	conflict	of	opposites	(muqābala means 




Thinking  (fikr)	figures	 in	 this	 scheme	of	 things	as	a	quwwa rūḥāniyya  (lit. 
spirital7	 faculty),	as	Ṣadrā	and	Qūnawī	agree	 Ibn	Sīnā	 (Avicenna,	d.	1037)	
originally  described  it.8	 It	 is	 the	 fourteenth	 of	 thirty	 terms	 associated	with	
knowledge	 that	Ṣadrā	 lists	beginning	with	perception.9	He	defines	 it	as	 the	
self’s	movement	 by	 judgment	 and	 conceptualisation	 toward	 apprehensions	






that contribute to actualisation at a higher plane than the material potentiality 
of	the	human	intellect	at	birth.	Thoughts	are	the	modality	that	prepares	the	
soul (kayfiyya nafsāniyya)	for	intellective	beholding	(li-mushāhada ʿaqliyya)	
and the telling (ḥikāya)	of	the	thing’s	universal	reality	(i.e.,	which	universality	
enters	into	the	mental	grasp	of	things).11 Intellectual actualisation embarked 
















conceptual	 equivalences	 between	 Ṣadrā’s	
and	 “Western”	 philosophies	 (Mulla  Sadra  
and Metaphysics: The Modulation of Being,	
Routledge,	 London	 2009).	 Also,	 Christian	
Jambet’s	 otherwise	 nuanced,	 influential	 and	
intellectually  engaging  L’acte  d’être,	Fayard,	
Paris	2002,	it	should	be	noted,	remains	a	high-
ly	 interpretive	 work.	 Cécile	 Bonmariage,	 Le 
Réel et les réalités: Mollâ Sadrâ Shîrâzî et la 
structure de la réalité,	Vrin,	Paris	2008,	offers	
a	 necessary	 corrective,	 perhaps,	 especially	
to  the  epistemological  bias  running  through  
many	contemporary	studies.	In	Farsi,	Sadra’s	
ontology	and	its	Sufi	elements	are	masterfully	
explained	 in	 Jalal-al-Din	Ashtiyani,	Hastī az 
nazar-i falsafa va ʿirfān,	Intishārāt-i	Nahzat-i	
Zanan,	Tehran	1980;	Maʿād-i jismānī: Sharḥ-i 








uli,	 Al-Nūr al-mutajallī fī’l-zuhūr al-zillī,	
Maktabat	al-Iʿlām	al-Islāmī,	Tehran	1995,	on	
the	 question	 of	 mental	 existence;	 Muham-
mad	 Fanaʾi	Ashkivari,	Maʿqūl thānī: Taḥlīlī 
az anvāʿ-i mafāhim-i kullī dar falsafa-yi is-
lāmī va gharbī,	 Imam	 Khomeini	 Institute,	
Qum	2008,	a	comparison	of	second-intention	
concepts	 like	 “universal”	 across	 traditions;	
and	 H.	 Hamid,	 “Para-yi ʿanāṣir-i Anaksi-
mandres  [Anaximander]  dar  nazariyya-yi  
vujūd-i Mullā Ṣadrā”,	 Iranshenasi	 6	 (1995),	
pp.	 817–832,	 focused	 on	 certain	 Presocratic	
elements	 in	 Ṣadrā’s	 philosophy.	 Among	 the	
Arabic	sources,	see:	ʿAbd	al-Majīd	Riḍā,	Ḥi-
wār al-falāsifa: Aṣālat al-wujūd wa’l-māhiya 
bayna Mullā Ṣadrā wa’l-falsafa al-ishrāqiyya,	
Al-Dār	al-Islāmiyya,	Beirut	2003,	on	Ṣadrā’s 
crowning	thesis,	the	“primacy	of	existence”.
3	   
This is suggested by the widely quoted max-
im	 attributed	 to	 Protagoras	 of	 Abdera	 (ca.	
490–420	BCE)	 that	was	first	 popularised	by	
the Falāsifa,	 who	 passed	 it	 down	 as:	 “Man	
measures	 every	 thing	 and	 is	 the	measure	 of	
every	thing.”
4   
Mullā	 Sadrā, Al-Shawāhid al-rubūbiyya,	
Būstān-e	Kitāb	Qum,	Qum	2003	or	2004,	p.	
276.
5	   
Ibid.,	p.	277.




for	 wisdom,	 as	 the	 term	 philo-sophia  con-




philosophical	 inquiry,	 consequently,	 cannot	
simply	 be	 relegated,	 as	 it	 generally	 is	 in	 a	
Eurocentric	worldview,	 to	 the	status	of	 local	
tradition	or	“religious	apologetics”.	As	a	tra-
dition,	Ḥikma includes ʿIlm al-ḥikma,	Ḥikma 
ilāhiyya,	Ilāhiyyāt,	Falsafa,	al-Falsafa al-ūlā,	
ʿIrfān,	Taṣawwuf,	etc.	Cf.	Anthony	F.	Shaker,	
Modernity, Civilization and the Return to His-
tory,	Vernon	Press,	Wilmington	2017, pp.	10–
15,	224.	Each	has	its	own,	if	loosely	defined,	
scope	 and	 aims.	 However,	 modern	 scholars	
often	 feel	 obliged	 to	 make	 perfunctory	 ref-
erences  to  the  more  elementary  division  be-
tween	the	experiential	mysticism	defended	by	
S.	H.	Nasr,	Henry	Corbin,	and	James	W.	Mor-
ris,	 among	 others,	 and	 the	 purely	 discursive	
philosophy	 emphasised	 by	 Fazlur	 Rahman,	
Hossein	 Ziai,	 John	 Wallbridge,	 etc.	 While	
rightly  discarding  anachronistic  neologisms  
like	“theosophy”,	the	latter	approach	takes	the	
technical	 jargon	of	Peripatetic	philosophy	as	
its principal yardstick. This division has led to 
sharp disagreements about how the very pur-
pose	of	philosophising	up	to	Ṣadrā’s	time	was	






in	 this	 paper	 in	 the	 light	 of	 the	 broader	 tra-
dition	or	the	threads	of	thinking	that	enabled	
him	 to	 produce	 a	 full-fledged	 philosophy	 of	
being. The technical language he assimilated 
from	predecessors	had	reached,	at	least	by	the	
time	 of	 Qūnawī	 (student	 and	 son-in-law	 of	
Ibn	ʿArabī),	a	plateau	of	sophistication	on	the	

























sophy	was	 treasured	as	 thinking	open	 to	being	 in	all	 its	dimensions,	 rather	












“special	 science”	 he	 established	 for	 that	 purpose	 figured	 among	 the	major	
branches	of	knowledge	we	now	take	for	granted	but	the	foundations	of	which	
were	 laid	 largely	 in	 Islamicate	 civilisation	 down	 to	 algorithmic	 reasoning,	




and driven by extensive institutional networks over the centuries. They help 
explain	the	affinities	of	Ibn	Khaldūn’s	purpose	with	the	prevailing	paradigm	
(unmūzaj)	that	Ṣadrā	later	elucidated.16 Central to philosophy was the quest 
for	wisdom	(ḥikma)	where	 the	wherewithal	of	 technical	science	had	 to	ad-
vance	the	well-being	of	human	beings	in	this	world	in	expectation	of	the	next.
We	 shall	 not	 concern	 ourselves	 with	 where	 exactly	 the	 philosophy	 that	











disposition	and	the	desire	for	it	that	impel	him	to	movement.18 The question is 
where	thinking	figures	in	this	movement	and	to	what	end?




power	 to	convey	 things	out	of	 the	outer	senses’	 reach.	A	single	 individual,	
totally	isolated	from	other	individuals	of	his	species	and	kind	would	quickly	











As  stated  in  Al-Shawāhid,	 p.	 299,	 and	 Ṣadr	
al-Dīn	Qūnawī,	 Iʿjāz al-bayān fī tafsīr Umm 
al-Kitāb,	 Muʾassasseh-ye	 Bustān-e	 Kitāb-e	
Qom,	Qom	1423	AH,	p.	30.
9  





11   
M.	Ṣadrā,	Al-Shawāhid,	p.	271.
12	   
M.	Ṣadrā,	Mafātīḥ,	p.	135.
13	   
Ibn	Sīnā,	“Al-Burhān”,	in:	Al-Shifāʾ,	al-Idāra	
al-ʿĀmma	 li’l-Thaqāfa,	 Cairo	 1956, v.	 9,	 p.	
51.
14   
M.	Ṣadrā,	Mafātīḥ,	pp.	135–136.
15	   
Ibid.,	p.	137.
16	   
Ibn	Khaldūn	set	out	systematically	to	explain	
the	 rise	 and	 fall	 of	 societies	 –	 after	 careful	
study	of	philosophy	–	for	the	sake	of	posterity,	
in	his	words.	The	range	of	meanings	and	uses	
associated  with  unmūzaj,	 originally	 a	 Farsi	
word,	 closely	 resembles	 that	 of	 παραδειγμα	
(grammatically,	model	 or	 likeness	 of	 an	 ex-
isting	 thing).	 Plato’s	paradeigma	 referred	 to	
the	Maker’s	patterning	of	the	world	according	
to	what	 is	 unchangeable,	 roughly	 the	 “com-
ing-to-be”	relative	to	“being”	(Timaeus,	28c);	
Aristotle	further	meant	an	argument	or	proof	
from	 example	 (Prior  Analytics,	 2.24).	 Ṣadrā	
has  both  these  meanings  in  mind  when  dis-
cussing	 the	paradigm	for	man’s	being	 in	 the	
world,	though	not	uniformly	so	in	every	con-
text.	 However,	 all	 differ	 radically	 from	 the	
epistemological	 and	 social	 scientific	 sense	
Thomas Kuhn and his  critics  attached to  the  
theory	 of	 the	 historical	 development	 of	 sci-
ence,	based	on	a	cyclic	or	spiral	phase	model.
17	   
After	discussing	the	divine	equalisation	in	the	
earth’s	creation	observable	“outside	the	body	
and	 the	 soul”,	 he	writes:	 “Having	 learned	 a	
paradigm [unmūzaj]	of	 the	benefits	 on	earth,	
now raise your head to the heaven and see and 
ponder	the	modality	of	the	heavens’	creation	
(…).”	–	Mullā	Ṣadrā, Al-Ḥikma al-mutaʿāli-
ya fī’l-asfār al-arbaʿa,	 Dār	 al-Maḥajja	 al-
Bayḍāʾ,	Beirut	2011,	v.	3,	p.	99.
18	   
Mullā	 Ṣadrā,	Al-Mabdaʾ wa’l-maʿād,	 Impe-
rial	 Iranian	Academy	 of	 Philosophy,	 Tehran	
1976,	p.	213.
19   
M.	Ṣadrā,	Al-Ḥikma,	v.	3,	p.	535.
20	   
Ibid.,	v.	3,	p.	535.


























ness. It is not the common sense (al-ḥiss al-mushtarak),	the	faculty	that	as-
sembles	sensations	into	their	first	unity,	that	properly	distinguishes	man	from	
other	animals.	People	can	build	houses	like	no	bird	can	its	nest	or	bee	its	hive;	









and thus to know things.
While	internal	to	the	person,	thinking	hence	opens	up	vistas	of	cooperative	ac-
tivity	without	which	no	one	could	fulfil	his	destiny	through	the	world	without	
succumbing to that world. But rarer than all those abilities taken together is 








substance	or	alive	in	the	manner	of	a	person.28 Language is how man becomes 
human in actuality because it gains him access to his causal source in a higher 
world he knows intelligibly.
In	his	philosophical	commentary	on	the	Qurʾān,	Ṣadrā	observes	that	God	de-
scribes	Himself	as	the	exterior	and	the	interior,	but	also	as	the	speaker	(mu-

















unity  between them stronger.32	Furthermore,	 it	 is	 intellective	existence	 that	
renders	the	self	the	one	thing	changed	by	nothing.	Here,	the	“suprasensible	
world”	indicated	by	the	term	maʿnawī	(derived	from	maʿnā,	meaning)	is	the	
closest	 linguistic	 analogy	 to	 the	 “intelligible	world”.	Meaning	 is	 conveyed	













altogether.  Modulated being (tashkīk)	 is	how	he	sees	 the	self	come	 into	 its	
own	because	–	not	in	spite	–	of	a	movement	he	describes	as	perfection-by-sub-
stance (ḥaraka fī’l-istikmāl al-jawharī),	based	on	his	famous	theory	of	mo-
22	   
M.	Ṣadrā,	Al-Mabdaʾ,	p.	213.	He	distinguish-
es	 this	 type	 from	 the	 “faculties	 for	moving”	
and	man’s	desire	for	that	which	he	is	naturally	
predisposed,	 mentioned	 above,	 for	 without	
these  the  deeper  apprehensions  every  per-
ception	relating	to	his	perfection	would	be	in	
vain.
23	   
M.	Ṣadrā,	Al-Ḥikma,	v.	3,	p.	536.
24	   
M.	 Ṣadrā,	Al-Mabdaʾ,	 p.	 212;	Mullā	 Ṣadrā,	
Tafsīr al-Qurʾān al-karīm,	Dār	al-Taʿāruf	li’l-
Maṭbūʿāt,	Beirut	1998,	v.	2,	p.	17.
25	   
M.	Ṣadrā,	Al-Ḥikma,	v.	3,	p.	537.
26	   
Ibid.,	v.	3,	p.	538.
27	   
Ibid.
28	   
The	 Qurʾān	 affirms	 the	 singleness	 of	 man’s	
self	out  of  which  God  created  him  as  a  pair  
and	a	multitude	(Q.	4.1,	7.189).
29	   
This	 is	 because	 God	 knows	 Himself	 as	 He	
is	 in	 Himself,	 while	 beings	 come	 to	 light	
through this knowledge (Tafsīr,	v.	2,	p.	17).
30	   
M.	Ṣadrā,	Al-Ḥikma,	v.	1,	p.	33.
31	   
Ibid.,	v.	3,	p.	549.








tion-in-substance  (al-ḥaraka al-jawhariyya).34	With	 that	 theory,	 which	 we	
shall	not	discuss	here,	he	leaves	behind	Peripatetics’s	immovable	substance.35
Exteriority as Otherness
When	marking	 a	 point	 about	 quiddity’s	 relation	 to	 existence,	 Ṣadrā	 often	





This	 “outside”	happens	 to	be	 the	world	 to	which	 the	modern	 age	has	 also	
consigned  social  relations.  Although  Hikma  did  not  regard  relation  as  real  
(ḥaqīqī),	 and	 as	 external	only	 as	determined	by	 the	 essence,	Ṣadrā	had	no	
reason	to	quibble	with	the	idea	of	a	person	at	once	existing	as	an	individual	in	
his own right and unable to survive in total	isolation	from	others	of	the	same	
species.	Thus,	social	relations	may	evince	something	irreducible	to	any	object	







single	 essence	 to	 the	 point	 of	 rupture,	where	 no	 coincidence	with	 the	 ob-
ject	 possessing	 this	 essence	 can	 be	 expected.	 Sabzavārī	 (d.	 1878	 or	 1881)	
quotes	al-Fārābī	to	the	effect	that	truth	may	refer	to	three	things:	the	statement	
corresponding	to	what	it	informs	about	whenever	it	corresponds	to	it,	to	the	
existent that occurs in actu (al-ḥāṣil bi’l-fiʿl),	and	to	the	existent	which	cannot	
be	falsified.37	These	hold	simultaneously	only	in	the	case	of	God,	who	is	said	
to be the truth (ḥaqq)	in	respect	of	that	which	is	informed	about	Him	and	in	
respect	of	existence,	such	 that	 there	 is	no	means	 to	falsify	Him.38	Whereas	
no	other	being	can	possibly	meet	all	these	conditions,	God	spoken	of	here	is	
still	Other,	the	negation	of	which	is	thought	to	be	requisite	for	anyone	even	



























While	 the	 single	 substance	 of	 soul	 and	 body	 differs	 from	 one	 “world”	 to	
another,	all	 their	“existences”	belong	to	 the	same	person.	When	the	person	
moves	from	the	existence	enclosed	by	the	self	(al-wujūd al-nafsānī)	to	intel-
lective existence (al-wujūd al-ʿaqlī)	and	becomes	intellect	in actu,	he	persists	





do-Theologia of Aristotle  (al-Uthūlūjiyya)	 to	 the	effect	 that	 the	 Intellective	
Man	casts	his	light	upon	a	Second	Man	in	the	world	belonging	to	the	soul,	




and becomes intellect in actu,	it	does	so	not	because	one	of	its	powers	(such	as	
sense	perception)	is	wrested	away	and	another	like	the	intellect	is	spared,	but	
because its essence	rises,	thereby	raising	the	rest	of	the	powers.42 
This	 quintessentially	 is	what	 the	modulation	 of	 being	 purports	 to	 show	 in	








and clearer than the body.
The	soul	and	body	are	one	sort	correlative	in	philosophy;	another	is	theory	
and	practice.	Granted,	philosophy	was	not	meant	to	teach	how	to	manufacture	




36	   
Ibid.,	v.	3,	p.	547.





38	   
Ibid.,	v.	1,	pp.	200–201.




41   
Ibid.,	v.	3,	p.	550.
42	   
Ibid.,	v.	3,	p.	551.





practical tools or to build houses. The inquiry into beingness or being-as-such 
(al-mawjūdiyya,	 τί	 τὸ	 ὄν	ᾖ	 ὄν),	 the	 subject-matter	 of	 the	First	 Philosophy,	








there  was  any  inconsistency  in  saying  that  theoretical  knowledge  could  be  
attached to the modality	of	action	(kayfiyyat al-ʿamal),	since	such	attachment	






intellect	first	synthesised	by	the	common	sense,	as	Ṣadrā	held.48 The material 










from	 the	essence	while	 remaining	“human”.	But	 if	 the	 inductive	enumera-
tion	of	 all	 its	 instantiations	 cannot	 establish	 the	 essence	of	 humanity,	 then	
what	other	form	of	reasoning	better	meets	the	objectives	of	philosophy?	As	
an	illustrative	device,	the	universal	never	translated	the	“distance”	of	its	in-
stantiations	into	a	full-blown	social	 thesis	 like,	say,	 the	one	Marx	argued	à 
l’hégélienne	according	to	which	the	reified	product	of	labour	represented	the	
human	 self-alienation	 epitomised	 by	 the	 factory	worker’s	 peculiar	 relation	









incarnated in man as such.49	Any	“reconciliation”	(i.e.,	munāsaba,	consonant 
relation)	 between	 the	 two	 elements	 of	 this	 unity	 found	 its	 origin	 in	God’s	
knowledge	 of	Himself	 as	He	 is	 in	Himself.	While	 no	 one	 is	 privy	 to	 this	
hidden	knowledge,	ultimately	nothing	can	either	exist	in	its	individuality	or	
be	 known	without	 it.	Accordingly,	 Ṣadrā	 is	 as	 keen	 as	 his	 predecessors	 to	













world.	We	 shall	 consider	what	Ḥikma	made	of	 this	 apparent	paradox	with	
regard	 to	 thinking	as	we	uncover	more	aspects	of	selfhood	and	bring	Kant	
briefly	into	the	discussion.
Man as the Speaking Rational Animal
The	standard	definition	of	man	was	 al-ḥayawān al-nāṭiq (articulate, rational 
animal),	after	the	Peripatetics.	There	is	but	one	Arabic	word	for	“rational”	and	
“capable	of	speech”	–	nāṭiq	(the	λόγον	in	the	Greek	expression	ζῷον	λόγον	







The nafs nāṭiqa (articulate,	rational self)	transcended	its	“parts”	in	a	way	that	
seemed	to	be	tantalisingly	paralleled	by	the	model	of	definition,	which	answe-









in	 the	 sanctified	 prophetic	 self	 or	 soul	 (al-nafs  al-qudsiyya  al-nabawiyya),	
the	distinctive	mark	of	which	is	having	no	need	to	learn	from	another	being	
44   
Aristotle	 specifies	 that	 actions	 (πράξεις)	 and	
productions	 (γενέσεις)	 are	 concerned	 with	
the individual  (Metaphysics,	 981a17),	 not	
the	 universal,	 through	 which	 the	 particulars	
cannot	be	determined.	For	example,	the	phy-
sician	 seeks	 to	 cure	Callias	 or	Socrates,	 and	
man only incidentally.
45	   
M.	Ṣadrā,	Sharḥ,	pp.	10–11.
46	   
Ibn	Sīnā,	“Al-Ilāhiyyāt”,	in	Al-Shifāʾ,	v.	1,	p.	4.
47	   
Mullā	 Ṣadrā, Sharḥ va taʿlīqāt-e Ilāhiyyāt-e 
Shifāʾ,	Al-Kamel	Verlag,	Freiburg	2011,	p.	18.
48	   
M.	Ṣadrā,	Al-Ḥikma,	v.	3,	p.	523.
49   
This	sums	up	Ṣadrā’s	position	and	the	broader	
background	to	the	idea	of	the	intellect’s	unifi-
cation with what is intellected.
50	   







argues	 indefatigably	 that	 the	single	person	 in	soul	and	body	 is	above	 them	
all.52 Nor can the soul thanks to which one is able to act as an individual be 
a	part,	 unlike	what	 Ibn	Sīnā	held	–	 at	 least	Ṣadrā’s	 construal	of	him	–	 for	
this	would	make	it	one	of	its	own	faculties.	On	the	contrary,	he	charges,	Ibn	
Sīnā’s	own	argument	can	only	imply	that	the	soul	is	the	completion	(tamām)	
of	all	 the	 faculties,	which	remain	multiple	only	 in	 the	world	of	separation,	
concomitance	and	division	–	precisely	the	terms	under	which	operates	ana-
lytical	thinking	–	but	are	conjoined	in	the	self	under	the	epithet	of	oneness 
(mujtamiʿa fī dhāt al-nafs alā naʿt al-waḥda).53
How	the	same	self	of	the	human	being	survives	every	moment	of	its	shifting	
(tabaddul dhātihi)	and	transformation	associated	with	natural	life,	including	
growth	 and	 ageing,54  rests  with  its  essential  oneness.  Its  potential  intellect  
alone	cannot	safeguard	this	oneness.	In	fact,	he	attributes	Ibn	Sīnā’s	inabili-
ty	to	solve	the	problem	of	the	self’s	survival	to	his	theoretical	approach,	on	
which	 he	 argues	 Ibn	Sīnā	 relied	 for	 a	 representation	 of	 the	 self	 concocted	
by	his	own	self	using	sensory,	imaginative,	estimative	and	theoretical	“arbi-
ters”.55	This,	he	says,	forced	him	to	carry	on	as	if	the	self	endowed	with	these	

















that	 the	problem	least	soluble	by	 this	means	–	 the	survival	of	 the	selfsame	
self	through	its	phases	and	modes	–	demands	“discipline	and	effort”	with	a	
view  to  obtaining  interior  unveiling  (mukāshafāt bāṭina),	 secret	 beholding	
(mushāhadāt sirriyya)	and	existential	inspection	(muʿāyanāt wujūdiyya),	this	
time	not	 just	 in	contradistinction	with	thinking	but,	away	from	the	worldly	





utor without some higher existentiating amr (command or factor),	which	has	















no associate (lā sharīk lahu)	and	is	above	all	relationality	in	His	utter	hidden-
ness	and	singularity.	He	is	properly	the	First	“beyond	perfection”,	undergoing	
no	 change	 and	 receiving	 neither	 affection	 nor	 intellecting	 from	an	other.59 
Since	relationality	is	a	mental	category,	not	existential,	Ṣadrā	refers	to	the	for-
mal	precept	that	must	then	govern	the	mental	distinctions	of	all	emergences	




ative	path	of	thinking is that saying the soul has corporeal attachments should 
not	contravene	its	“sanctification”	from	the	lower	matters	through	the	univer-
















on its own at any level.
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The Structural Manifestation of Intellect
No	wonder	the	human	capacity	to	know	the	realities	of	things	became	a	bone	











es	 that	are	 interlaced	with	manifoldness	 in	a	manner	 typical	of	construction	
forms.64	Simpler	than	the	syntax	of	a	sentence,	for	example,	the	line-formation	
of	persons	 standing	next	 to	each	other	has	 the	precept	of	a	 single	 form	ge-
nerically known as an ijtimāʿ  (assembly,	group,	society,	conjunction).	From	
this	rudimentary	form,	he	explains	the	“transformation”	that	conducts	to	ev-
er-higher	structural	relations	among	the	members	of	a	whole	(jumla,	also	sen-







































incorporeal	and	not	 itself	 the	body	 it	oversees	as	 its	 instrument.71	And	 just	
as the perceiver is one as a single knowing but many	in	the	self	as	a	combi-
nation	of	faculties,	bodily	parts,	etc.,	so	the	object	of	perception	is	one	thing	
yet  many in  attributes  and  properties.  All  these  structural  relations  have  to  
be	 resolved	 from	 the	 root	 according	 to	 the	 singular	unity	of	perceiver	 and	
perceived.	Although	“man”	may	be	said	to	be	the	many	things	that	exhibit	his	
multiplicity,	where	matter	 is	 receptive	 to	change	and	 therefore	quantifiably	
smaller	or	bigger,	moving	or	stationary,72 intellect raises him above his own 
composition.
The Primordial Singularity of the Self











learns and teaches as a single soul. Man is a single essence in relation to the 
totality	of	all	the	aspects	belonging	to	his	haecceity	(anniyya,	thatness,	or	ex-
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If	 this	 is	 so,	 Suhravardī	 rhetorically	 asks,	 how	 then	 could	 someone	 refer	
self-awareness	back	 to	himself	 solely	by	 intellecting	 the	whole	 through	 its	
parts.74	 Self-awareness	 (shuʿūruhu bi-dhātihi)	 persists	 separately	 from	 any	
awareness	of	the	bodily	parts,	and	it	cannot	be	obtained	through	an	image	of	
oneself	posing	as	I-ness	(anāʾiyya).75 It belongs to the entire person that no 
partial	image	could	fully	represent.	Though	an	image	of	the	I is distinguish-
able	from	the	acting,	self-aware	I	–	no	less	than	from	the	essence	of	any	he 
(whether	the	objectified	he	of	another	person	or	the	I  as the other)	–	it	still	
belongs to one’s own	I-ness,	not	someone	else’s,	even	as	a	he-representation.	
This	is	a	standard	argument	that	others	like	al-Jīlī	proffered,	as	well.	The	point	
is	that	while	a	particular	self-perception	cannot	be	higher	than	the	perceiver’s	
self,	 it	 remains	a	manifestation	of	 this	 self,	not	 that	of	an	entity	abstracted	
from	matter	 external	 to	 the	 self,	 as	 Suhravardī	 understood	 the	Peripatetics	
to be trying to say.76	This	is	because	thingness	cannot	simply	be	superadded,	
he	says,	least	of	all	to	the	one	aware	(shāʿir)	of	his	self	through	himself.	The	
person	 stays	 the	 selfsame	person	manifested	 in	various	ways	 to	himself,	 a	
light	unto	himself	and	thus	also	“a	pure	light”.77	Perceiving	the	otherness	of	
a	thing,	whatever	that	thing	is,	may	be	posterior	to	his	self,	but	by	assuming	










the	paradigmatic	thrust	of	the	debate	on	perception.	Kant	writes,	“I think must 
be	 capable	 of	 accompanying	 all	my	 representations;	 otherwise,	 something	
would	be	represented	in	me	which	could	hardly	be	thought”.80	In	other	words,	
the I is the I think which is thought with it in every thought as the condition-
ing	ground	of	the	unifying	I	conjoined	–	als der bedingende Grund des eini-
genden Ich-verbinde mitgedacht wird.81	At	the	same	time,	experience	cannot	
establish the I,	 if	 the	I	 is	by	definition	what	is	not	manifold	as	such	(etwas 
schlechthin Unmannigfaltiges)	but,	on	the	contrary,	the	very	basis	of	experi-







and what makes the thinking essence called the soul a substance.
But	he	confesses	that	the	real	reason	he	calls	it	a	substance	is	that	one	cannot	
deduce	from	the	I	the	“I	am	a	thinking	essence	persisting	for	myself”,	neither	





conditions as such (das schlechthin Bedingende),	namely,	the	I as the original 
synthetic	unity	of	apperception,	cannot	be	determined	with	the	help	of	what	
it	 conditions	 in	 the	first	 place.84	He	offered	a	 telling	quotation	where	Kant	
explains	that	“[t]he	‘I	think’	expresses	the	act	of	determining	my	Dasein	(i.e.,	
my	being	an	existent)”,	whereby	“the	Dasein is	then	already	given”	but	not	
the	manner	 in	which	“I	should	posit	 in	me	that	manifold	which	belongs	 to	
it”.85	To	this	manner	of	positing	(the	giving	itself)	“belongs	a	self-intuition,	at	
the	ground	of	which	lies	a	given	a priori	form	–	time	–	which	is	sensible	and	
belongs	to	the	receptivity	of	the	determinable”.86 The problem is that without 
another	self-intuition	that	“gives	what determines	in	me	before	the	act	of	de-
termining	I	represent	to	myself	only	the	spontaneity	of	my	thinking	–	of	the	










employed by the thinking I	–	inappropriate	for	determining	the	I,	given	that	
the I	 subsumes	 them,	 “the	 impossibility	of	 an	ontological	 interpretation	of	
the I	in	general	does	not	follow	from	this	unsuitability.	It	follows	only	on	the	
assumption	that	the	sole	possible	basis	for	knowledge	of	the	I is the same kind 
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ness is intrinsic to the very thinking they employed. Thinking-about is always 
object-related	even	in	the	absence	of	an	object.	But	Ḥikma	emphasises	that	
the	self	remains	its	own	I through every order in which it subsists and with 
every	object	it	thinks;	and	that	only	below	this	in	its	self-awareness,	so	long	
as the I	is	its	own	object	of	thought,	it	is	an	other	–	never	completely	identical	
to the essence	of	the	real I.
It	should	be	obvious	by	now	that	this	formulation	was	not	the	last	word	of	










the	unities	between	knower	 and	known	figure	 for	man	 in	 the	unfolding	of	
knowing	and	being,	which	unfolding	no	thought	can	capture	in	its	totality.
The Paragon of Perception
In	this	scheme,	however,	it	is	intellect	(not	the	thinking	faculty)	that	most	ful-
ly	preserves	what	Ṣadrā	calls	the	active	lordly	command	and	giver	of	percep-
tion (al-amr al-rabbānī al-darrāk al-faʿʿāl)90	in	the	unity	of	the	human	per-
ceiver	and	his	object.	The	synonyms	he	relies	on	to	explain	idrāk (perception)	






therefore,	but	 the	 reverse	 and	only	 in	 this	particular	 sense.	 Just	 as	 the	 self	
unites	its	faculties	and	instruments	before	it	may	be	said	to	perceive	anything,	
Ṣadrā	says	in	a	similar	vein,	so	“the	existence	of	the	thing	[perceived]	in	the	
soul is intrinsically [that thing’s] existence for the self (wujūdahu li’l-nafs)”.94 
Given	that	a	person	is	intellect,	soul	and	body,	therefore,	what	lies	“outside”	
them	cannot	 be	 the	original	 locus	 for	 the	 self’s	 awareness	 (mawḍiʿ shuʿūr 
al-nafs).	For,	the	natural	relatedness	of	the	self	(al-ʿilāqa al-ṭabīʿiyya)	–	with	
respect	 to	whatever	it	perceives	–	occurs	proportionately	(bi’l-qiyās)	 to	 the	
body	and	faculties	that	the	soul	disposes	and	governs,	not	to	what	is	external.
There	is	no	need	to	read	modern-style	subjectivism	into	this.	One	has	simply	










perceived”,	 is	why	“the	 intellect	which	perceives	all	 things	 is	all	 things”.95 
The darrāk	is	not	an	external	substance	indifferent	to	the	movements	of	the	
person whose intellect is only in potentia. The noetic and existential orders 
manifested	in	man,	body	and	soul,	merely	presage	the	source	and	giver	of	per-
ception,	by	whom	man	rises	above	the	temporal	world	he	inhabits	to	the	ple-
nary	life	that	is	a priori to his physicality and determines his true destination.
Ṣadrā	also	speaks	of	the	“real	freedom”	that	lies	in	what	is	innate	to	the	soul,	
not	 the	body,	and	which	excludes	 the	 teaching	and	habituation	of	a	person	
based	on	someone	else’s	authority,	however	“excellent”	these	activities	may	
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Indeed,	Ṣadrā	may	be	said	 to	culminate	a	 long	 tradition	dating	back	 to	 the	
Greeks	 for	which	 thinking	 is	 at	 once	 an	 object	 of	 analysis	 and	 the	 prima-
ry	means	by	which	one	arrives	at	judgments.	What	has	changed	in	modern	
times	is,	not	this	formal	distinction	but,	the	positivist	terms	under	which	it	is	





pondering	 creation	 as	 if	 one	 could	 somehow	 escape	 the	 boundaries	 of	 the	
world within which one thinks and lives. The universe taken as a whole could 











as	Ṣadrā	and	the	whole	Ḥikma	tradition	stand	witness,	that	being had then to 
be	totally	separated	from	thinking	and	intellection.	Contemporary	philosophy	
has,	in	any	event,	found	ways	to	get	around	this	formality.






source	of	 this	being,	 in	Ṣadrā’s	words,	man	can	neither	foresee	 the	 totality	
of	consequences	of	his	actions	nor	his	 intellect	grasp	the	realities	of	things	







U radu se istražuju ključni aspekti Mullā Ṣadrāova razumijevanja čovjekova bivstvovanja u 
svijetu, gdje se embrij opažanja i mišljenja pojavljuje u jedinstvenim uvjetima čovjeka kao ar-
tikuliranog društvenog bića. Biće koje može govoriti također govori sebi i o sebi. No s obzirom 
na to da čovjekova »prava stvarnost« nalazi svoj korijen u božanskom znanju i bivstovanju u 
dvostrukoj egzistencijaciji, u srcu njegova bivstvovanja u svijetu leži intelekt pomoću kojega se 
on »vraća« iz materijalnosti u njegov izvor u božanskom, gdje sve znanje i bivstovanje počinje 
i završava. Problem znanja i bivstvovanja – izrazivo u smislu jednog i mnogih – potječe još iz 
vremena prije predsokratovaca. Da bi se Ṣadrāovo razumijevanje moglo umjestiti, razmatraju 




Heideggerovoj kritici. To niti je prvenstveno epistemologijski problem islamske filozofije niti je 






den Menschen und den Ursprung des Denkens
Zusammenfassung
In der Abhandlung werden Schlüsselaspekte von Mullā Ṣadrās Auffassung des menschlichen 
Seins in einer Welt ergründet, in der der Embryo der Wahrnehmung und des Denkens unter den 
einzigartigen Gegebenheiten des Menschen als artikuliertes Gesellschaftswesen erscheint. Ein 
Wesen, das sprechen kann, spricht auch zu sich selbst und über sich selbst. Aber angesichts 
dessen, dass die „wahre Realität“ des Menschen ihre Wurzeln in göttlichem Wissen und Sein 
in zweiartiger Existenziation findet, liegt im Herzen seines Seins in der Welt der Intellekt, mit 
dessen Hilfe er von der Materialität zu seiner Quelle im Göttlichen „zurückkehrt“, wo alles 
Wissen und Sein beginnt und endet. Das Problem des Wissens und des Seins – ausdrückbar im 
Sinne von einem und vielen – stammt noch aus den Zeiten vor den Vorsokratikern. Um Ṣadrās 
Betrachtungsweise einordnen zu können, werden andere Philosophen in Betrachtung gezogen, 
einschließlich Kant, dessen Logik der um das „Ich“ gesammelten Argumente in Heideggers 
Kritik angegeben ist. Dies ist weder ein zuvörderst epistemologisches Problem der islamischen 







la question de l’homme et de la source de la pensée
Résumé
Ce travail recherche les aspects clés de la conception de Mollā Ṣadrā Shīrāzī de l’être de 
l’homme dans le monde, où l’observation et la réflexion de départ apparaissent dans des condi-
tions uniques de l’homme en tant qu’être social construit.  L’être qui est doté de la parole se 
parle également à lui-même et parle de lui-même. Mais compte tenu du fait que « la véritable 
réalité » de l’homme trouve sa racine dans la connaissance divine et de son être au sein d’une 
existence double, au cœur de son être dans le monde se situe l’intellect à l’aide duquel l’homme 
« revient » depuis la matérialité pour aller vers sa source dans le divin, où toute connaissance et 
tout être commencent et se terminent. Le problème de la connaissance et de l’être – exprimable 
dans le sens de l’un et du multiple – provient déjà de l’époque qui précède les présocratiques. 
Afin d’être en mesure de situer la conception de Mollā Ṣadrā Shīrāzī, d’autres philosophes sont 
analysés, y compris Kant, dont la logique d’arguments réunis autour du « Je » est mentionnée 
dans la critique de Heidegger. Il n’est question principalement ni d’un problème épistémolo-
gique de la philosophie islamique, ni d’un problème dépourvu d’intérêt pour l’animal social du 
nom de « l’homme » (insān).
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